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TALKING ANIMALS, LAW, PHILOSOPHY – AND BEYOND  
 
by Raffael N Fasel 
 
1. Introduction 
In his recent book, the primatologist Frans de Waal asks if we are “smart enough to know how smart 
animals are.”1 He explains that the history of ethology is replete with examples of unsuccessful attempts 
to determine whether other animals possess features – self-awareness, language, culture, and so on – 
which we humans deem to be particularly valuable.   
Self-awareness is a case in point. In one study, three elephants were tested on their ability to 
recognise themselves in mirrors. Primates, dolphins, and other animals generally believed to be “smart” 
had already passed the so-called “mirror test” that is often used as a benchmark for consciousness. In the 
mirror test, subjects are marked somewhere on their body, and then expected to investigate the mark on 
their own body rather than that of their mirror image. At first, none of the three elephants displayed the 
anticipated behaviour. As it turned out, the humans studying the elephants had used mirrors that were 
too small – and, on top of that, inaccessible to the pachyderms’ trunks.2 Once the design of the experiment 
had been improved, one of the elephants successfully passed the test. The two other test subjects failed 
to inspect the marked parts of their bodies, but instead used the mirror to analyse other, non-marked 
parts.3 Can we conclude from this study that the first pachyderm is self-aware while his two fellow 
elephants are not?  
For de Waal, the issue with the mirror test, as well as with similar tests which aim to identify 
human-like traits in animals, is that they are often insufficiently adapted to the unique natures of the 
beings under investigation. The mirror test, for instance, is based on visual self-recognition, which works 
well with human beings, for whom the sense of sight is essential.4 For animals that primarily use different 
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senses than vision, on the other hand, the test is ill-suited. Dogs, for instance, rely largely on olfaction 
and hearing, and have thus far not been able to pass the test.5 For this reason, such tests are particularly 
prone to yield false negatives – thereby playing to existing prejudices about the inabilities of other 
animals. This is not to say that studying the cognition and behaviour of other animals is a futile 
endeavour. As de Waal points out, the key consists in “trying to understand [animals] on their own 
terms”, rather than on human terms.6 
Tests like the mirror test usually say more about the unfeathered bipeds conducting them than 
about their animal “subjects”. In particular, these tests bespeak the human urge to determine which (if 
any) features make members of the human species special, and which (if any) features they share with 
other earthlings. This urge has become particularly prominent since an event we can refer to as the 
grounding of humanity. Humanity became grounded in a “merely” earthly existence with its inclusion in 
the Linnaean taxonomy and its subjection to the studies of other naturalists. These naturalists examined 
the human being as one among many animals, thereby effectively stripping it of the special ontological 
status many believed it to possess. The intellectual importance of this event – which is, in many ways, 
still ongoing – can hardly be overestimated. Long-standing claims about the superiority of human beings 
who, created in the image of God, were all supposed to be equally endowed with an immortal soul, 
seemed to be losing their appeal. With the almost exponential growth of knowledge about nature in the 
Enlightenment, it became increasingly difficult to defend the claim that humans were exceptional. The 
boundary between them and other animals was called into question from within, as naturalists were 
debating whether they should classify newly discovered tribes as human or non-human. And it was 
challenged from without, through the discovery of orang-utans and other primates which many suspected 
might belong to the human species.7 
In the wake of these challenges, it was no longer enough to assert the superiority of humanity by 
invoking traditional or religious beliefs. Instead, with the critical spirit of Enlightenment, rational 
arguments were required to back up claims of human exceptionalism. Identifying the precise features of 
human nature that made humans (and only humans) special, however, proved difficult. The theory of 
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evolution revealed that living beings differ in degree, but not in kind.8 As such, although human beings 
have some features which are particularly distinctive, there are almost always other species which possess 
these features to at least a lesser degree, and there are almost always some humans who do not possess 
the feature in the same way as their brethren. Reason is a good example. It is generally believed that what 
makes human beings special is their capacity to think and act rationally. The problem with this capacity, 
however, is that some animals (including other primates, dolphins, and elephants) also seem to have the 
ability to reason. This makes reason overinclusive as a criterion for “specialness”. At the same time, some 
human beings – as a result of congenital disabilities, advanced age, certain illnesses, or other impairments 
– are incapable of rational decision-making and acting. Hence, reason is also underinclusive as a relevant 
criterion. Other proposed features also have serious shortcomings. The advances in knowledge of the last 
200 years have made it increasingly difficult to argue convincingly that human nature is wholly different 
from the “natures” of other living creatures. 
Some, of course, do not seem to be impressed with this difficulty. But to avoid it, they must 
neglect what the most up-to-date science has to say about the capacities of other animals. Such thinkers 
often end up falling back upon pre-Darwinian theories of human essence, of scala naturae, or similarly 
outdated views. This is as indefensible intellectually as it is morally. It is one thing to have a questionable 
metaphysics: getting the physics wrong, as it were, is another thing altogether.  
 
2. Talking Animals, Law and Philosophy 
But as important as it is to have an informed descriptive account of the nature of human and other animals, 
this alone will not determine how animals are, or ought to be, treated – legally, morally, or otherwise. In 
order to be able to answer these questions, we need a firmer understanding of how philosophy and law 
approach animals. To do this, in turn, we should avoid framing philosophy and law as entirely separable 
disciplines. Philosophy, if unaided by more practical disciplines, runs the risk of being too abstract. 
Entangled in “trolley problems” and similar “intuition pumps”, it is in danger of missing out on the 
fundamentally practical nature of humans and other animals. Law, although it can be coarse, is much less 
susceptible to this problem. Embedded in social practices, it has its finger on the pulse of the respective 
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society it governs. At the same time, however, this great practical strength of law is also its greatest 
intellectual weakness. With its focus on the concrete, it risks missing the forest for the trees. Here, 
philosophy can provide a remedy, infusing law with critical and argumentative depth. It can help equip 
law with the intellectual tools to go beyond the legal status quo and to reshape it according to societal or 
moral requirements. 
Putting law and philosophy into dialogue is particularly important when it comes to the question 
of how we ought to treat animals. In these fields, and especially at their intersection, many fundamental 
questions are still largely unresolved. For example, is the role of law simply to mandate improved welfare 
for animals exploited by humans? Or do animals also require fundamental rights to protect their basic 
interests? If the latter, what are the grounds upon which animals should have such rights? And what rights 
should they have? Do animal rights “compete” with human rights? Are animals entitled to some sort of 
“political” status – for example, through some form of “citizenship” or other mechanism for community 
participation?  Constructive exchange between disciplines will be essential to answering these questions. 
As Paul Waldau notes, in Animal Studies,  
Both a great number and a wide variety of disciplines are needed if Animal Studies is 
to engage the past, present, and future possibilities of human interactions with living 
beings outside our own species. There is simply no other way to explore the diversity 
of other animals, respect the variety in human responses, and describe the peculiar 
dynamics of human animals.9  
The Talking Animals, Law and Philosophy series, which was launched at the Faculty of Law in 
Cambridge in 2015, was set up with this purpose in mind. In the minds of its founders, law and legal 
science have remained relatively untouched by the animal turn that has changed the way other fields 
approach non-human animals. To the limited extent that law has turned its attention to the fate of animals, 
the way it treats them is all too often insufficiently informed by philosophy. At the same time, both law 
and philosophy are often poorly versed in other disciplines. The aim of Talking Animals is to help remedy 
this situation by providing an engaging and rigorous forum for debate and ideas for scholars and 
practitioners working at the intersection of law, philosophy, and the sciences. Since its inception, Talking 
Animals has hosted talks by speakers from fields as diverse as bioethics, environmental law, global 
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justice, democratic theory, and animal welfare law. A further year of exciting talks is in the pipeline as 
this edition goes to press. 
 
3. Overview of this special issue 
Papers from three of the series’ talks are included in this special issue of the Global Journal of Animal 
Law. Despite the difference in approaches, the authors whose work appears here are each attempting, in 
their different ways, to spell out what humans and other animals are like and how they ought to be treated. 
The capacity to suffer is a feature many will agree is shared by humans and countless other 
animals. But what exactly does it mean for an animal to suffer? Important legal consequences turn on 
whether or not an animal has suffered. Yet, judges and lawyers dealing with such cases often lack the 
information necessary to identify what exactly constitutes suffering in an animal. In his article “Suffering 
in non-human animals: Perspectives from animal welfare science and animal welfare law”, Peter Fordyce 
provides a much-needed perspective on what it means for animals to suffer, what can cause such 
suffering, and how we can recognise suffering in animals. Shedding light on the ways in which key terms 
such as “sentience”, “welfare”, “suffering”, “emotions”, “feelings”, “stress”, and “distress” are used in 
the animal welfare science literature and in animal welfare protection legislation, Fordyce emphasises 
how a more careful use of these terms is likely to improve legal decision-making. 
In his article, Fordyce defines suffering as “an unpleasant/aversive subjective mental state, caused 
by physical or psychological stressors that impinge on the animal in such a way that a failure to avoid 
(or adapt easily to) them threatens (or potentially threatens) its viability as an organism”.10 This definition 
is expedient because it easily accommodates terms such as “pain”, “fear” or “distress” which are often 
used in animal welfare protection legislation that does not directly talk of “suffering”. More importantly, 
however, Fordyce’s definition allows us to base our assessment of whether or not an animal has suffered 
on objective data rather than emotional reactions. In the past, determinations of whether an animal has 
suffered have largely been made on anthropomorphic grounds: the more an animal’s reaction resembled 
a human’s reaction to pain, the more likely we were to conclude that the animal has suffered. While such 
inferences may sometimes be corroborated by animal welfare science, its development over the last half 
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century has provided us with data and methods of assessing animal suffering in a much more precise 
way. Sometimes, the scientific findings will contradict our anthropomorphic conclusions. A test from 
1973 is a good example for this. As Fordyce explains, researchers found that intensively farmed chickens 
actually preferred to walk on a type of wire floor which an influential report had (from an 
anthropomorphic perspective) considered to be worse for their welfare. The preferences of animals such 
as the chickens in our example can be measured in so-called “preference/choice” tests. In these tests, 
animals are made to work to avoid something they do not want, or to get something they want. By 
measuring the effort they put into it, we can draw conclusions as to the strength of their preferences or 
aversions.  
Today, a whole range of further well-proven scientific methods and parameters are used for 
assessing animals’ well-being. These include ethograms (that is, detailed descriptions of the 
characteristic behaviours of a species against which an individual animal’s reactions can be measured), 
biochemical and haematological parameters, hormone levels, heart and breathing rate, body temperature, 
and anatomical observations. But as Fordyce observes, even these objectively measurable parameters 
require interpretation. This is where experts in the field of animal welfare science come in. It is their role 
to interpret the data that is often produced as evidence in court to determine whether or not an animal has 
suffered. Fordyce points out, however, that courts should reassess the criteria by which they accept 
witnesses as ‘experts’. Even veterinary surgeons may not always possess the necessary expertise in 
animal welfare science in order to be able to correctly assess the available data. It is therefore often not 
the absence of such data but the lack of competent interpretation that will lead to a flawed assessment of 
an animal’s welfare. To round out his contribution, Fordyce adds a useful glossary to his article, in which 
he defines the most commonly used terms in animal welfare science. 
Once one accepts that animals suffer and that we can detect their suffering, one must ask whether 
animals should possess fundamental rights and/or legal personhood as a means to protect them from such 
suffering. In their article “From Inside the Cage to Outside the Box: Natural Resources as a Platform for 
Nonhuman Animal Personhood in the U.S. and Australia”, Randall Abate and Jonathan Crowe focus on 
two particular jurisdictions – the U.S. and Australia – in order to consider legal avenues for going beyond 
the current property status of animals, to the establishment of animal legal personhood. Abate and Crowe 
begin their article by studying the recent attempts of the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) to bring about 
the recognition of legal personhood for primates in the U.S. The NhRP files so called habeas corpus 
writs, where these writs are a common law tool which allows plaintiffs to demand that a judge verify the 




legality of a person’s captivity. Providing affidavits by renowned primatologists, the NhRP argues that 
chimpanzees should be considered “legal persons” for the purposes of the writ of habeas corpus. Abate 
and Crowe note, however, that the cases filed by the NhRP are yet to produce a positive legal outcome. 
At the time of writing, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division had just affirmed an earlier 
decision by the County Supreme Court, which declined to have the chimpanzees in question transferred 
to a sanctuary.11 
Travelling across the Pacific, Abate and Crowe then shed light on possible pathways to achieving 
animal legal personhood in Australia. The article first explores the potential that Australian standing rules 
offer for raising animals’ interests before the courts, noticing a positive (albeit fragile) trend towards a 
more liberal interpretation of the “special interest” requirement, which has made it easier for animal 
welfare organisations to obtain standing. Abate and Crowe then examine the prospect of invoking writs 
of habeas corpus in Australia. They consider this route difficult because Australian courts take a 
conservative approach to recognising detentions as illegitimate (including in the case of humans), as well 
as because the idea of animals as property is so deeply-entrenched in Australian law. Then the article 
considers whether the existing legal institution of guardianship is serviceable for furthering the interests 
of animals. The authors examine several ways in which human beings can act on behalf of animals to 
promote their interests. 
In the final part of their article, Abate and Crowe discuss recent cases granting legal personhood 
to landforms and other natural formations, like rivers. Arguing that the moral and legal arguments in 
favour of animal legal personhood are stronger when considered in light of pre-existing recognitions of 
legal personhood, they propose that if such landforms are granted the status of legal persons then so, a 
fortiori, should sentient beings like animals. The article concludes by rejecting some of the common 
objections against animal legal personhood. 
While these first two contributions highlight the importance of getting the science, the philosophy, 
and the law right, the third and final article explores the pragmatic challenge of building the political 
consensus that is required for action. In “The Boyd Group and Animal Experimentation: A Case Study 
of Deliberation”, Robert Garner discusses the difficulties and prospects of getting to an agreement on 
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controversial cases, like those concerning animal experimentation. In his article, Garner uses the Boyd 
Group – a group consisting of stakeholders in the British animal testing debate, which was founded in 
1992 to foster a dialogue on an issue that seemed to have reached an impasse – as a case study for the 
deliberative method. Garner examines whether deliberation in the Boyd Group has managed to reduce 
differences enough to achieve consensus on animal experimentation, as its formation was intended to do.  
After introducing the central themes in the field of deliberative democracy, the article sheds closer 
light on the specifics of the Boyd Group and discusses, among other things, its participants, the 
relationship between these participants and the organizations they represent, and the Group’s working 
method. Garner notes that there are several reasons – such as the fact that its members are partisan and 
represent the viewpoints of particular groups – why the Boyd Group cannot serve as an ideal testing case 
for deliberative theory. He observes however that the Group’s operating principles are consistent with 
the theoretical framework of the deliberative method. 
The case study reveals that there is little evidence that the Group’s deliberations have induced 
any substantive change of views in its participants. However, progress has been achieved in how the 
participants regard each other and how they perceive the legitimacy of decisions taken by the Boyd 
Group. Furthermore, while consensus could not be reached on many issues, the participants did come to 
an agreement about using animals for testing cosmetics and household products; about the use of non-
human primates for experiments; and about the role of local ethical review processes. Based on these 
findings, Garner concludes that the Boyd Group’s deliberations have delivered results in at least some 
areas. What the study also shows, however, is that the Boyd Group has failed to reach a consensus on the 
core issue: whether animals should be used in experimentation at all. Ending on a hopeful note, the article 
points out that the Boyd Group is still active, and that – as such – it is always possible that it may reach 
a consensus on the fundamentals at some point in the future.  
It seems safe to say that better interdisciplinary dialogues, as well as a deeper understanding of 
the natures of other animals are both prerequisites for agreement about issues like animal testing. If we 
seek justice for animals, we need to harness the insights, vocabularies, and ways of thinking of as wide 
a range of disciplines as possible.12 This special issue of the GJAL aims to take a step in this direction. 
We hope that it can contribute at least to some degree to improving the lot of animals, countless numbers 
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of whom still languish in unspeakable conditions. And even if some judge this goal too ambitious, we 
can still conclude, with Waldau, that the task would be worthwhile, if not for the good of animals, then 
at least to become aware of our own, human, limitations.13 
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